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How does changing measurement change 
management behaviour? A review of the 
evidence 
Anne Beatty* 
Abstract-The effect of a change in accounting standards on reporting firms’ economic behaviour is often a 
concern raised by those opposing the accounting change. Some view these changes in behaviour as an inevitable 
consequence of a rule change. Others are not persuaded by these arguments. Although the empirical evidence of 
changes in economic behaviour is not extensive, it is consistent with accounting changes resulting in firms changing 
both operating and financing decisions. The evidence of which economic incentives give rise to these changes is 
more limited. Changes in economic behaviour appear consistently to be related to the regulatory use of accounting 
numbers. In addition, some evidence related to incentives created by management compensation and by market 
discipline has been found. Evidence of the importance of debt covenants in inducing accounting changes is less 
convincing given limited examination of actual debt contracts and the use of poor proxies of covenant slack. The 
existing research does little to tell us whether any changes in behaviour are for the better or for the worse. 
1. Introduction 
Critics of changes in accounting standards often 
argue against the changes because they will result 
in changes concerning reporting firms’ economic 
behaviour. A recent example of these arguments 
occurred during a Congressional Hearing of the 
Committee on Financial Services (US House of 
Representatives, 2004). In that hearing, US 
Representative Royce argued that economic be- 
haviour had already changed as a result of the em- 
ployee stock option expensing proposal of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
Opponents of expensing options argued it would 
impede job creation and slow economic growth. 
Similar concerns have been expressed about many 
other proposed accounting changes. Although this 
type of argument is frequently made, the rationale 
is not often given or defended, and implicit in the 
criticism is the assumption that changes in behav- 
iour are undesirable. 
For some, the idea that accounting changes 
would lead to changes in behaviour seems obvi- 
ous. Consistent with this view Sandy Burton, for- 
mer Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
chief accountant, is quoted in Forbes (1977) as 
saying ‘...there is no doubt that measurement stan- 
dards have an impact on behaviour. That impact 
cannot be ignored in setting measurement stan- 
dards. There’s a delicate balance you have to 
have.’ This statement implies that the notion that 
*Anne Beatty is Deloitte and Touche Chair in Accounting, 
Fisher College of Business, the Ohio State University, 442 
Fisher Hall, 2100 Neil Avenue,Columbus,OH 43210 USA. E- 
mail: beatty.86@osu.edu 
standard-setters should care about these changes in 
behaviour is equally obvious. 
For others the idea that accounting change 
would lead to changes in behaviour is not believ- 
able. Beresford ( 1998), former FASB chairman, 
states that ‘most of these kinds of allegations about 
so called “economic consequences” are pretty dif- 
ficult, if not impossible, to prove and even mem- 
bers of Congress usually are not persuaded by 
them in the final analysis.’ His statement suggests 
that these arguments merely reflect political pos- 
turing. 
Even those who believe that changes in behav- 
iour occur do not necessarily agree about whether 
the change is for better or worse. For example, 
some suggest that the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards SFAS 106, requiring accru- 
al of post-employment benefits, provided a ‘wake- 
up call’ about the magnitude of the costs 
associated with retiree benefits. This view is ex- 
pressed by Ben Neuhausen, a partner in Arthur 
Andersen’s professional standards group, who was 
quoted by Singh (2001) as saying, ‘I think some 
companies were genuinely clueless about how 
much these benefits were going to cost them over 
the long haul ... once Statement 106 forced them 
to measure these obligations, a lot of companies 
realised that they had offered benefits they could 
not afford.’ In contrast, Reuters (1990) reported 
that when commenting to the SEC on fair value ac- 
counting for investment securities Federal Reserve 
chairman Alan Greenspan states that ‘the adoption 
of market-value accounting for the investment se- 
curities portfolio might also affect the amount of 
securities that banks are willing to hold. Many 
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64 
institutions would likely reduce their holdings of 
marketable instruments, thereby having the unde- 
sired effect of reducing the liquidity of banking or- 
ganisations .’ 
Furthermore, some standard setters hold the 
view that whether or not behavioural changes 
occur and whether those changes are good or bad 
is irrelevant for setting standards. For example, 
Leisenring (1 990), former vice-chairman of the 
FASB states that ‘Unfortunately, it is once again 
fashionable to suggest that the FASB should aban- 
don the notion that decision-useful information 
must be neutral and should consider the “econom- 
ic consequences” of its decisions. Some would 
even assert that the FASB should try to determine 
in advance who will be relatively helped or hurt by 
the result of applying a particular accounting stan- 
dard, and consider “public policy implications” 
when it establishes accounting standards. In a 
word, bias the information reported to influence 
the capital allocation or other economic decisions 
toward some predetermined objective, thereby un- 
dermining the proper functioning of the capital 
markets and impairing investors’ and creditors’ 
capital allocation decisions .’ 
These views suggest that the issue of whether 
accounting standard setters should consider result- 
ing changes in economic behaviour when writing 
accounting standards is controversial. For some, 
changes in management behaviour seems like an 
obvious consequence of accounting change, while 
for others the claims of behavioural changes seem 
difficult, if not impossible to prove. Furthermore, 
some argue that firms are better off as a result of 
these changes while others argue that firms are 
damaged by the changes. Finally, some believe 
that regardless of the desirability of the changes in 
behaviour they should not be considered when set- 
ting standards. 
The level of controversy about changes in man- 
agement behaviour has not been matched by the 
amount of research in this area. Generally, there 
has been little published academic research in ac- 
counting that has examined whether firms actually 
change their economic behaviour in response to 
accounting changes. Less than 10% of the studies 
focusing on FASB accounting standards published 
in the top three US academic accounting journals 
(i .e. Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics and Journal of Accounting 
Research) directly examines the effects that these 
accounting standards have on firms’ economic be- 
haviour. A majority of the studies consider valua- 
tion issues and roughly a quarter of the studies 
examine accounting choices firms make when 
adopting the standard. The explanation as to why 
there is so little emphasis on this seemingly im- 
portant research question is not obvious. One pos- 
sibility is that this research has been undertaken 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
but that accounting changes do not actually lead to 
changes in economic behaviour. A bias against 
publishing null results may have led to few of 
these studies appearing in these journals. A second 
possibility is that the difficulty in documenting 
these changes in behaviour convincingly may be 
too discouraging. Another possibility is that this 
research is not well received because those who 
believe that firms’ economic behaviour responds 
to accounting changes find the results obvious, 
while those that do not believe that firms would re- 
spond to accounting changes do not believe the re- 
sults. 
Despite the relative lack of emphasis on examin- 
ing whether changes in accounting standards result 
in changes in economic behaviour, there has been 
some research published over the past 25 years 
documenting this phenomenon. This research can 
help to answer the questions of whether the 
changes occur. Although these studies often dis- 
cuss the incentives for these changes in behaviour, 
few of the studies conduct tests of which econom- 
ic incentives gave rise to the documented changes. 
To some extent this research can help answer the 
question of why these changes occur. The research 
does little to tell us whether the changes are for the 
better or for the worse, or to inform standard-set- 
ters about whether they should address these po- 
tential changes in behaviour. 
The next section reports the existing evidence 
documenting changes in firms operating and fi- 
nancing activities following several important ac- 
counting changes that have been implemented 
over the past three decades. The following section 
discusses potential economic incentives that 
would lead firms to change their behaviour as a re- 
sult of a change in accounting rules. The final sec- 
tion provides suggestions for further research and 
conclusions. 
2. Measurement changes 
During the past three decades, there have been 
many important accounting changes that potential- 
ly might have led firms to change their economic 
behaviour. Such changes could relate either to op- 
erating activities or to financing decisions. 
Research studies have been conducted for several 
of these changes to determine whether evidence of 
their effect in economic behaviour can be found. 
Conducting this type of research is challenging. 
Evidence based on surveys such as the one con- 
ducted by Goodacre et al. (2006), is not likely to 
persuade sceptics who view statements about be- 
havioural changes as political posturing because 
survey responses may not be consistent with ac- 
tions actually taken. Documenting a stock market 
reaction is not sufficient to conclude that a behav- 
ioural change has occurred, since the market reac- 
tion will not be limited to these behavioural 
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changes. This suggests that convincing evidence 
of a behavioural change requires documenting that 
economic behaviour is different after the account- 
ing change than it was before. However, econom- 
ic behaviour will be affected by factors other than 
the accounting change. Convincingly isolating the 
effect of the accounting change will require either 
a well-specified model of the economic behaviour 
or an appropriate control sample. Since firms can- 
not be randomly assigned to be control firms, the 
use of a control sample will typically require a cor- 
rection for self-selection. 
65 
focus on large firms. 
Elliott et al. (1984) attempt to reconcile the in- 
consistent results found in Horowitz and Kolodny 
(1981) versus in Dukes et al. (1980). Using the 
Horowitz and Kolodny method of measuring 
changes in R&D expenditures, they find a change 
in behaviour for both listed firms and OTC firms. 
Using the Dukes et al. (1980) method, they find a 
change in behaviour for the OTC firms but not for 
the listed firms. They argue that the matched-pair 
design used in both studies may not be appropriate 
because it does not control for self-selection prob- 
lems caused by comparing firms that choose to 
capitalise against those that chose to expense R&D 
prior to the accounting rule change. 
Sheheta (1991) examines the issue of self-selec- 
tion bias in the analysis of the economic conse- 
quences of the mandatory change in accounting for 
R&D. He finds a more negative change in R&D 
expenditures for firms that previously capitalised 
relative to firms that previously expensed R&D 
after controlling for the self-selection bias. These 
results confirm a change in economic behaviour 
associated with the change in accounting for R&D, 
but do not consider the economic incentives that 
gave rise to these changes. 
While none of these studies examine whether 
R&D expenditures were optimal prior to the ac- 
counting change, the implicit assumption underly- 
ing these studies is that the accounting change had 
an undesirable effect on R&D expenditures by the 
expenditures declined after the accounting change. 
2.1.2. Accrual of Other Post Employment Benefits 
(OPEB) liabilities 
Another important accounting change with the 
potential to affect firms’ operating decision is the 
requirement that other post retirement benefits 
(OPEBs) be accounted for on an accrual rather 
than cash basis. This accounting change resulted in 
approximately $300 bn in unfunded benefits liabil- 
ities added to the balance sheet of US public firms. 
This large increase in firms’ leverage may have 
provided incentives to reduce benefits to mitigate 
the financial statement effect of this accounting 
change. 
Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) document the preva- 
lence, magnitude and timing of retiree health care 
benefit reductions associated with the adoption of 
SFAS 106 and examine the determinants of the 
benefit-reduction decisions. Unlike the SFAS 2 
studies they do not have a control sample of firms 
that engage in the transaction being studied, and 
which were unaffected by the accounting change. 
Instead they attempt to control for factors other 
than SFAS 106 that might lead to changes in post- 
retirement benefits. They claim that their results 
indicate that firms cutting benefits are financially 
weaker and have higher retiree health care costs at 
2 . I .  Measurement changes that affect operating 
activities 
2.1 . I .  Mandated expensing of research and 
development (R&D) 
Several studies of changes in economic behav- 
iour have focused on SFAS 2, which requires the 
expensing of research and development expendi- 
tures. This issue has undoubtedly attracted atten- 
tion for a variety of reasons. In  part the focus on 
the change in accounting for R&D reflects the im- 
portance of these expenditures to economic 
growth and productivity. The mixed results found 
in the original studies of this accounting change 
have most likely also resulted in additional re- 
search on this issue. 
Horowitz and Kolodny (198 I )  document a re- 
duction in R&D spending at the time of adoption 
of SFAS No. 2 for a sample of over-the-counter 
(OTC) traded firms that were forced to change 
from capitalising to expensing R&D expenditures 
relative to a matched control sample of firms that 
expensed R&D prior to SFAS 2. They discuss sev- 
eral possible explanations for the documented 
change in behaviour. First, they mention the possi- 
bility that the market for the small firms examined 
may not be efficient. Second, they note that, re- 
gardless of whether the market is efficient, if man- 
agers believe that the market is inefficient then 
accounting changes may result in changes in be- 
haviour. The third and fourth possibilities men- 
tioned are that management compensation plans or 
contractual lending constraints might induce a 
change in behaviour. Finally, it is noted that stock 
exchange listing requirements or government con- 
tract evaluation procedures might result in a 
change in economic behaviour. Although they dis- 
cuss these possibilities, they do not explicitly test 
for why these changes occurred. 
Dukes et al. (1980) also examine the behaviour- 
a1 changes in R&D expenditures following the is- 
suance of SFAS 2. They fail to find support for an 
effect on research and development expenditures 
attributable to SFAS 2 for a sample of New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) firms. They acknowledge that 
their lack of findings may be attributable to their 
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66 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
the time benefits are reduced. They conclude that 
SFAS No. 106 cannot be viewed as the sole cause 
of the health care benefit reductions. 
To the extent that the benefit reductions occurred 
in firms that were financially weak and had higher 
retiree health care costs, the results of this study 
are not inconsistent with arguments made that 
SFAS 106 helped firms realise that they had of- 
fered benefits which they could not afford. 
2.1.3. Fair valuing investment securities 
For financial institutions the change to fair value 
accounting for investment securities was an im- 
portant accounting change with the potential to af- 
fect their operating decisions. The use of fair value 
accounting for only a single type of asset while ig- 
noring concurrent changes in the values of other 
assets and liabilities could lead to unrealistic 
volatility in reported equity, and therefore provide 
an incentive to change investment behaviour. 
Beatty (1995) compares changes in the invest- 
ment behaviour of bank holding companies that 
early adopted SFAS 115 versus those that did not 
in the SFAS 1 15 early adoption quarter. Her analy- 
sis includes a self-selection correction for the early 
adoption decision. She finds a decrease in both the 
proportion of assets held in investment securities 
and the maturity of the investment securities held. 
These changes are related to the banks regulatory 
capital ratio, suggesting that the volatility in recog- 
nised fair values may have led banks to change in- 
vestment behaviour due to regulatory capital costs 
that could have arisen from the accounting change. 
She concludes that shortening the maturity of the 
investment portfolio may reduce interest income 
earned or increase their interest rate risk. Increased 
exposure to interest rate changes could make the 
banking industry more volatile, which was one of 
the arguments raised by Greenspan when opposing 
this standard. 
2.1.4. Fair valuing derivatives 
Increased volatility in earnings for derivatives 
not qualifying for hedge accounting treatment may 
alter use of derivatives. Zhang (2006) examines 
whether the FASB’s standard on accounting for 
derivative instruments (SFAS 133) caused a 
change in corporate risk-management behaviour. 
She hypothesises that the effect of the standard on 
firms’ risk-management activities varies depend- 
ing on the hedging effectiveness of the derivative 
instruments. She finds that after the adoption of 
SFAS 133 interest-rate risk, foreign exchange-rate 
risk, and commodity price risk decreases for firms 
that were speculators relative to firms who were 
hedgers. Zhang concludes that SFAS I33 discour- 
aged firms’ speculative use of derivative instru- 
ments. She does not consider reasons that firms are 
concerned with earnings volatility. To the extent 
that standard setters are interested in how account- 
ing changes affect managements’ behaviour, her 
evidence of a decrease in the speculative use of de- 
rivatives suggests a potentially beneficial change 
in behaviour. 
2.2. Measurement changes that affect financing 
decisions 
Lease financing is a commonly used vehicle for 
financing long-term assets. An important account- 
ing change that had the potential to affect how 
firms finance their operations was the requirement 
by SFAS 13 that capital leases be recognised as as- 
sets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Increases 
in reported debt associated with capitalising leases 
may result in firms structuring leases to obtain op- 
erating lease treatment. 
Imhoff and Thomas (1988) document a signifi- 
cant change in the structure of leases in response to 
SFAS 13 for a sample of firms that disclosed a 
high amount of capital leases prior to the account- 
ing change relative to a sample of firms that re- 
ported a low amount of capital leases prior to the 
accounting change. They find a corresponding in- 
crease in the amount of operating leases used by 
these firms, which suggests a substitution from 
capital leases to operating leases. However, they 
find that total leases declined after the accounting 
change. They also find that the high-lease group 
has greater increases in equity financing and larg- 
er decreases in debt financing after the accounting 
change. They do not consider reasons for these fi- 
nancing changes. 
Beattie et al. (1998) document that key account- 
ing ratios would be affected by the change in lease 
accounting required by FRS 5 for a random sam- 
ple of 300 listed UK companies. While they sug- 
gest that because these ratios are employed in 
decision-making and in financial contracts the 
changes may affect managers’ behaviour, they do 
not examine whether these behaviour changes oc- 
curred. 
Altamuro (2006) reports similar findings in her 
examination of whether firms decrease their use of 
synthetic leases after FASB Interpretation No. 46 
(FIN 46) required that they be reported on the bal- 
ance sheet. Prior to this change in accounting rule, 
companies acquired assets using this type of fi- 
nancing structure so that for financial accounting 
purposes the asset and the corresponding depreci- 
ation of the asset were recorded on the books of 
the special purpose entity rather than on their own. 
This off-balance sheet financing treatment was 
curtailed by FIN 46’s requirement that their pri- 
mary beneficiary consolidate these variable inter- 
est entities. She reports a decline in synthetic lease 
usage relative to mortgage financing after FIN 46 
was adopted. She also does not examine the rea- 
sons for the change in behaviour. To the extent that 
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the objective of the change in accounting was to 
reduce the use of off-balance sheet financing vehi- 
cles, Altamuro’s results suggest that the standard 
may have produced the desired outcome. 
2.3. Summary of studies documenting behaviour 
changes 
Research on six important accounting changes 
has documented evidence consistent with changes 
in operating and financing activities following the 
accounting changes. For five of the six changes 
examined the findings were relative to a control 
sample of firms unaffected by the accounting 
change. In two studies where a self-selection cor- 
rection was included the correction resulted in a 
larger effect rather than a smaller one. The primary 
focus of these papers has been on the existence of 
a change rather than on the reason for the change. 
The results in these papers suggest that these 
changes in behaviour may be beneficial in some 
circumstances but undesirable in others. 
61 
argue that ‘there is an important cash flow and 
value linkage introduced by accounting’s contract- 
ing role’. Similar views are expressed in Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P 2006), which states that S&P, as 
part of its surveillance process, monitors the po- 
tential impact of changes in accounting standards. 
S&P (2006) states that it ‘is possible accounting 
changes could trigger financial covenant viola- 
tions or regulatory or tax consequences, and could 
even influence changes in business behaviour, 
such as a change in hedging policy’. 
The FASB and IASB provide a contrasting view 
of the role of contracting in financial reporting. 
FASB (2006) states that ‘because general purpose 
financial reports are prepared in accordance with a 
generally accepted set of financial reporting stan- 
dards and often are audited, the parties to an agree- 
ment may consider them useful as the basis for 
contractual agreements. However, the parties to an 
agreement are generally able to specify how finan- 
cial reporting standards are applied for the purpose 
of that agreement, including which information in 
a financial report is used and how it is used. For 
example, a restrictive covenant may be stated in 
terms of a particular line item or subtotal on a fi- 
nancial statement, prepared in accordance with fi- 
nancial reporting standards in effect at a specified 
date. Therefore, reports prepared solely as the 
basis for contractual agreements are specialised re- 
ports, rather than general purpose financial reports 
that are the subject of this draft framework.’ 
Research examining the extent to which con- 
tracts rely on GAAP accounting numbers as of the 
reporting date should help distinguish between 
these two opposing views. 
3.1 . I .  Debt contracting 
One of the most commonly discussed rationales 
for why accounting changes might lead to changes 
in firms economic behaviour relates to the use of 
accounting numbers in debt contracts. These argu- 
ments assume that debt contracts contain financial 
covenants and that the covenant calculations are 
based on GAAP in force at the time of the calcula- 
tion rather than in effect at the time that the firm 
enters into the contract. Several papers indicate 
that this may not always or even frequently be the 
case. Begley and Freedman (2004) document that 
the use of financial covenants in public debt con- 
tracts has changed through time. Specifically, they 
note a dramatic decline in the use of accounting 
numbers over the last three decades. Accounting- 
based covenants restricting dividends and addi- 
tional borrowing appear in less than 10% of the 
most recent sample of debt contracts examined. 
They conclude that recently executed public 
covenants provide little incentive for managers to 
manipulate accounting numbers. The implications 
for a likely change in economic behaviour induced 
3. Potential economic motives for changes 
in behaviour 
In their ‘Conceptual Framework jor Financial 
Reporting: Objective of Financial Reporting and 
Qualitative Characteristics of Decision - Useful 
Financial Reporting Information ’, the FASB and 
IASB acknowledge that the information provided 
by general purpose external financial reporting is 
directed to the needs of a wide range of users 
rather than only to the needs of a single group. The 
potential users of financial reports that they dis- 
cuss include creditors, equity investors, govern- 
ments, regulators, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
and the public. The existence of many different fi- 
nancial statement users suggests that accounting 
changes could lead to changes in firms’ economic 
behaviours for a variety of reasons. 
The research examining potential reasons for be- 
haviour changes has considered a variety of incen- 
tives including debt and compensation contracts, 
capital and rate regulation and market incentives. 
This research also faces several challenges. 
Examining the contracting incentive can be diffi- 
cult because contract terms are not always readily 
available. Constructing measures correlated with 
the unobservable contract terms has proven to be 
difficult. Since regulators may use either generally 
accepted or regulatory accounting principles, 
whether regulatory incentives exist is determined 
on a case specific basis. The explanation for why 
the market would care about a reporting change 
can be difficult to articulate and to measure. 
3.1. Contracting role of accounting 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) state that ‘ac- 
counting plays an important role both in contract 
terms and in monitoring those terms’. They further 
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by a change in accounting are similar. Begley and 
Freedman (2004) also re-examine the correlation 
between a firm’s leverage ratio and use of 
covenants. They find that the rank correlation 
dropped from nearly 60% during the 1970s to 
below 5% in the late 1990s. They conclude that the 
leverage ratio is no longer a good indicator of the 
use of financial covenants in public debt. 
In contrast to public debt, private debt continues 
to extensively use financial covenants. However, 
there is substantial evidence that those covenants 
commonly are not affected by changes in GAAP. 
An early paper (Leftwich, 1993) considers the use 
of non-GAAP numbers in covenants calculations. 
He examines recommended covenant definitions 
in Commentaries, which is a reference manual for 
lawyers who negotiate restrictive covenants in 
lending agreements. In addition, Leftwich exam- 
ines 10 private lending agreements to verify that 
the definitions contained in Commentaries appear 
in actual lending agreements. He finds that the def- 
initions used in covenant calculations use GAAP 
as a starting point, but make modifications to the 
GAAP numbers. The modifications disallow cer- 
tain increases to income and assets that are re- 
quired by GAAP but insist on certain decreases in 
income and assets that are not required by GAAP. 
During the period that he examined, he found that 
covenants were based on GAAP numbers in force 
at the time of the covenant calculation rather than 
GAAP at the time that the contract was signed. 
More recent evidence on covenant calculations 
in private lending agreements suggests that the use 
of GAAP at the time of covenant calculation has 
also changed. Mohrman ( 1996) examines a sample 
of 228 lending contracts entered into between 
1963/1990 including 148 bank loans, 41 public 
debt issues and 39 private placements. She finds 
that roughly 25% of the contracts do not include 
accounting-based covenants. The remaining 75% 
with accounting-based covenants are split roughly 
equally into those with covenant calculations af- 
fected by accounting changes and those that are 
unaffected by accounting changes. 
Further evidence on how accounting changes af- 
fect covenant calculations is provided by Beatty et 
al. (2002). They examine how the interest rate 
charged for a sample of 206 bank loans enter into 
between 1994 and 1996 is affected by the exclu- 
sion of either voluntary or mandatory accounting 
changes from the calculation of covenant compli- 
ance. They find that nearly 75% of the loans ex- 
clude the effect of mandatory accounting changes 
from covenant calculations, while roughly 50% 
exclude the effects of voluntary accounting 
changes. They also examine how the rate charged 
on the loan is affected by the exclusion 
of accounting changes. They find that the rate 
charged on the loan is 84 basis points lower when 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
voluntary accounting changes are excluded and 7 1 
basis points lower when mandatory accounting 
changes are excluded. Beatty et al. (2002) conclude 
that excluding mandatory accounting changes may 
reduce the expected renegotiation costs of the loan 
in the event of an accounting change. 
Evidence on the correlation between a firm’s 
leverage ratio and closeness to covenant violation 
for private loans is provided by Dichev and 
Skinner (2002). They state that ‘since we can 
measure covenant slack directly, we also assess the 
construct validity of firm leverage as a proxy for 
closeness to covenants. We find that while 
covenant slack and leverage are correlated, the 
magnitude of the correlation is fairly small in eco- 
nomic terms, implying that leverage is a relatively 
poor proxy for closeness to covenants.’ 
The results of these papers suggest that, while 
debt covenant calculations may provide an incen- 
tive for firms to change their economic behaviour 
in response to accounting changes in certain cir- 
cumstances, this incentive may not be as prevalent 
as is often assumed; either because public debt 
does not contain financial covenants or because 
the covenants contained in private debt are not af- 
fected by the accounting changes. In addition, the 
results in these papers indicate that the leverage 
ratio is unlikely to be a good measure of a debt 
contracting incentive to change economic behav- 
iour in response to an accounting change. Some 
suggest that leverage may instead proxy for the 
firm’s target leverage ratio. However, the reason 
that firms would not adjust their target for the ac- 
counting change is not clear. 
3.1.2. Compensation contracts 
A second contracting incentive that has been 
considered is executive compensation contracts. In 
contrast to debt contracts that are explicit about 
how accounting numbers will affect contract cal- 
culations, typically bonus calculations are linked 
more loosely to specific accounting metrics. It  is 
unclear whether the lack of specificity in the con- 
tract will make it more or less likely for account- 
ing changes to result in changes in economic 
behaviour. On the one hand, compensation con- 
tracts provide more flexibility to adjust bonus cal- 
culations, on the other they provide no explicit 
exclusion of the effects of accounting changes. 
There is some empirical evidence that bonus cal- 
culations do provide an incentive for firms to 
change their economic behaviour in response to 
accounting changes. Marquardt and Wiedman 
(2007) examine the economic consequences of 
changes in the financial reporting requirements for 
contingent convertible securities (COCOs). For a 
sample of 199 COCO issuers from 2000-2004, 
they find that issuers are more likely to restructure 
or redeem existing COCOs to obtain more 
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favourable accounting treatment when the finan- 
cial reporting impact on diluted earnings per share 
(EPS) is greater, and when EPS is used as a per- 
formance metric in CEO bonus contracts. They 
conclude that these results provide new evidence 
that managers are willing to incur costs to retain 
perceived financial reporting and compensation 
benefits. 
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tier 1 capital as used in the Board’s regulatory 
capital requirements for banking organisations .’ 
This statement suggests that any given account- 
ing change may or may not affect the calculation 
of regulatory capital ratios and therefore may or 
may not provide an incentive for a change in eco- 
nomic behaviour. Consistent with this ambiguity, 
Bens and Monahan (2006) discuss how the FASB 
Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46) requirement that 
sponsors consolidate their highly leveraged asset- 
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits affect- 
ed regulatory capital ratio calculations. These 
assets were assigned a zero risk weight by the reg- 
ulator and therefore this accounting change did not 
affect the calculation of the risk-based capital ra- 
tios. However, this accounting change did affect 
the calculation of the leverage ratio, which for US 
banks is required in addition to the risk-based cap- 
ital requirements, because GAAP assets are used 
in the denominator of leverage ratio. Bens and 
Monahan (2006) examine how sponsors of ABCP 
conduits responded to this accounting change. 
They find that the volume of ABCP began to de- 
cline upon the introduction of FIN 46 and that this 
decline is primarily attributable to a reduction in 
US banks’ sponsorship of ABCP. Also, they find 
that US banks entered into costly restructuring 
arrangements to avoid having to consolidate their 
conduits per FIN 46. They conclude that in certain 
settings, accounting standards appear to have real 
effects on investment activity. 
3.2.2. Rate regulation 
For rate regulated utilities, accounting changes 
can create a perverse incentive. D’Souza (1998) 
explains that for rate-regulated firms expense-in- 
creasing accounting standards have a positive ef- 
fect on their cash flows because the rate recovery 
mechanism is based on accounting numbers. 
Managers of rate-regulated firms therefore have 
incentives to respond to expense-increasing ac- 
counting standards in ways that enhance the finan- 
cial statement impact of the accounting change. 
She investigates the reporting and contracting re- 
sponses of electric utilities to SFAS No. 106, 
which requires that other post-retirement benefits 
be accounted for on an accrual rather than cash 
basis. D’Souza (1998) documents that those man- 
agers of rate-regulated firms, which face greater 
uncertainties about future rate recoveries, have 
lower incentives to reduce employee benefits 
when adopting SFAS No. 106. 
3.3. Market response 
While the idea that changes in economic behav- 
iour might result from accounting changes that af- 
fect covenant or bonus calculations seems to be 
widely accepted, there is considerable disagree- 
ment about whether managers might change their 
3.2. Regulation 
For firms in regulated industries, the use of 
GAAP numbers in regulation potentially provides 
an incentive for changes in management behav- 
iour. Theoretically regulators, like lenders, could 
modify the accounting numbers that are used in 
regulatory calculations to meet their specific 
needs, consistent with the views expressed by the 
FASB and IASB about specialised rather than gen- 
eral purposes. However, practical concerns that 
regulators may be captured by the industries that 
they are supposed to regulate have led regulators 
to frequently use GAAP numbers rather than regu- 
latory accounting numbers. These GAAP numbers 
may be used in both capital regulation in the fi- 
nancial services industry and rate regulation in 
public utilities. 
3.2.1. Capital regulation 
To the extent that regulatory capital ratios are 
computed using GAAP numbers, changes in ac- 
counting standards created an incentive for affect- 
ed firms to change their economic behaviour. 
However, some ambiguity exists about the effect 
of accounting changes on the calculation of regu- 
latory capital ratios. In the US, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199 1 
(FDICIA) requires that regulatory accounting 
standards be no less stringent than GAAP. 
Compliance with this regulation results in changes 
in GAAP inducing changes in regulatory account- 
ing standards. However, the board of governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (2005) has stated that: 
‘Although GAAP informs the definition of regu- 
latory capital, the Federal Reserve is not bound 
by GAAP accounting in its definition of tier 1 or 
tier 2 capital because these are regulatory con- 
structs designed to ensure the safety and sound- 
ness of banking organisations, not accounting 
designations designed to ensure the transparency 
of financial statements. The current definition of 
tier 1 capital differs from GAAP equity in a 
number of ways that the Federal Reserve has de- 
termined are consistent with its responsibility for 
ensuring the soundness of the capital bases of 
banking organisations under its supervision. 
These differences do not constitute differences 
between regulatory reporting and GAAP ac- 
counting requirements, but rather are differences 
only between GAAP equity and the concept of 
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economic behaviour to avoid a negative market re- 
sponse to an accounting change. Those who argue 
that the market can see through the effects of ac- 
counting changes argue that managers would not 
alter their economic behaviour for this reason. In 
contrast, survey results by Graham et al. (2006) 
suggest that managers are willing to sacrifice eco- 
nomic value to meet the markets expectations. In 
particular, they find that more than half of the sur- 
vey participants state that they would delay start- 
ing a new project to avoid missing an earnings 
target. 
Beatty (2006) examines banks’ response to re- 
cent changes in accounting for Trust Preferred 
Securities that affect how these securities are re- 
ported in the balance sheet but do not change the 
calculation of regulatory capital. To examine 
whether the potential market response to this ac- 
counting change affected economic behaviour, the 
paper examines whether publicly traded banks and 
those with more uninsured liabilities were more 
likely to issue these securities before the account- 
ing change, but not after. The results suggest that 
accounting changes can lead to changes in banks’ 
economic behaviour even when the change in ac- 
counting does not affect regulatory capital calcula- 
tions. This is consistent with bank managers acting 
as if they are concerned with the markets’ response 
to the numbers reported after the accounting 
change. 
3.4. Summary of incentives 
The evidence suggests that while contracting in- 
centives for behavioural changes may exist, they 
are not ubiquitous. Identifying when they exist is 
not trivial. Regulators determine whether regulato- 
ry incentives exist on a case specific basis. 
Behavioural changes occur when a regulatory in- 
centives exists. Evidence on the importance of a 
market incentive is limited. 
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regulatory use of accounting numbers. The evi- 
dence on the importance of debt covenants in in- 
ducing accounting changes is less convincing 
given that the proxies typically used to measure 
covenant slack have been shown to be poor. 
Research examining the contracting incentive 
using actual contract terms would be more con- 
vincing. Some evidence has also been found relat- 
ing to incentives created by management 
compensation and by market discipline, although 
these two incentives have not been examined to 
any great extent. Additional research exploring a 
market incentive for changes in management be- 
haviour seems warranted. A better understanding 
of why managers change their behaviour might 
help determine whether changes in behaviour are a 
good or a bad thing, at least from the perspective 
of the effected firm. This research is unlikely to be 
able to address broader social welfare concerns. 
Regardless of this controversy over the effects of 
accounting changes on altering management be- 
haviour, it seems relevant that standard setters 
should be interested in how economic behaviour 
changes as a result of their standards. 
4. Suggestions for future research and 
conclusions 
The issue of whether accounting standard setters 
should consider resulting changes in economic be- 
haviour when writing accounting standards is con- 
troversial. For some, changes in management 
behaviour seem like an obvious consequence of 
accounting change, while for others the claims of 
behavioural changes are difficult, if not impossi- 
ble, to prove. Additional research documenting the 
existence of behavioural change in response to ac- 
counting changes would strengthen the existing 
findings of the academic research that suggests 
that important accounting changes do result in 
changes in firms’ operating and financing behav- 
iour. There is even less consensus about the rea- 
sons for these changes. Changes in economic 
behaviour appear to be related consistently to the 
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